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I. INTRODUCTION1
Delaware has long attempted to provide business structures that reflect
the demands of the business community in an efficient, productive, and
predictable manner.  The Delaware series (“the series” or “Delaware se-
ries”) is a prime example of a legislative response to market demands of
the business community.  The Delaware series is an entity structure op-
tion, which allows an entity to isolate its assets from others within desig-
nated “series”2—an election that is available in Delaware limited
partnerships (“LPs”), limited liability companies (“LLCs”), and statutory
trusts.3  The series structure combines the internal flexibility necessary for
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, Wilmington, Delaware.
Professor Conaway is a member of the Delaware Bar and teaches corporate, partnership,
LLC, statutory trust law, fiduciary duties in entity governance and contract law.
† Juris Doctor Candidate 2013, Widener University School of Law; Internal
Managing Editor, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law; Wolcott Fellow to Chief Justice
Myron T. Steele; Co-Founder of Widener Law Transactional Law Competition Team.
1. This article references an unpublished research paper of the author. See Ann E.
Conaway, A Business Review of the Delaware Series: Good Business for the Informed
(Widener Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-19),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097645.
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(a) (2012) (allowing for a limited liablity
company agreement to establish one or more series).
3. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3804 (2012). Delaware also provides Captive Cell
Insurance with series similar to that in series LLCs. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6934
(2012).  A “protected cell” company (“PCC”) is one that utilizes segregated accounts or in-
surance companies of captive insurers. See id. However, the use of the captive cell insurance
series requires adherence to specific insurance mandates that do not otherwise exist for non-
insurance series entities. See id.  On January 25, 2010, Delaware’s Insurance Commissioner
authorized the first series entity captive that could use the LLC form rather than the PCC
form. See Allan G. Donn et al., Series LLCs, in CHOICE OF BUSINESS ENTITY- 2010 UPDATE:
97
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different types of businesses and investors along with the statutory and
judicial support4 of giving the “maximum effect to the principle of free-
dom of contract and to the enforceability of [LLC] agreements” that Dela-
ware promises to all of its unincorporated business organizations.5  Several
states have now imitated the Delaware series concept.6  Other states make
reference to the series concept.  These states, however, do not provide all
of the internal protections offered by the Delaware series.7  Despite the
CHOOSING AND USING BUSINESS FORMS IN UNCERTAIN TIMES 2010, at 52, ALI-ABA VIDEO
L. REV., at 141, 145 (ALI-ABA Video Law Review, Course of Study Materials, 2010).  By
using the LLC to accomplish captive insurance, the persons forming the LLC avoids the
minimum premium tax per cell imposed by the Delaware PCC act. See tit. 18, § 6914(a).  On
January 25, 2010 Delaware’s Insurance Commissioner issued a statement that Delaware was
the only jurisdiction in which an entity can form a series entity captive. See Press Release,
Karen Weldin Stewart, Del. Ins. Comm’r, Delaware Insurance Commissioner Karen Weldin
Stewart Licenses World’s First Serial Captive Insurance Company (Jan. 25, 2010), available
at http://delawareinsurance.gov/departments/news/012510-Press-FirstCaptiveCompany.shtml.
The Commissioner further provided that the number of captive insurers in Delaware in 2010
increased from 48 to 96. See Press Release, Karen Weldin Stewart, Del. Ins. Comm’r, Dela-
ware Doubles Number of Captive Domiciles in 2010 (Jan. 28, 2011), available at http://www.
delawareinsurance.gov/departments/news/012811-Press-CaptiveDomicilesDoubled.shtml.
For a discussion of the Delaware Captive Insurance Series Entity, see Matthew J. O’Toole &
Robert L. Symonds, Jr., A Winning Combination, Delaware Report 19, available at http://
www.delawarecaptive.org/files/Symonds&O’Toole2.pdf. See generally tit. 18, § 6934(3) (stat-
ing that “[t]he assets of a protected cell shall not be chargeable with the liabilities of any
other protected cell, or . . . of the sponsored captive insurance company generally.”). See also
D.C. CODE § 31-3931.04(b) (2012) (permitting “incorporated protected cells”); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 33-28-301(1) (West 2011) (authorizing a protected cell company).
4. Tit. 6 § 18-1101(b).  Gerber v. Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC, 2012 WL 34442,
at *9–12  (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012) (interpreting an interested party transaction provision in an
LP agreement under contract principles); CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238, 242 (Del. Ch.
2010) (stating that there is no duty to creditors in Delaware LLC since the derivative statute
does not grant standing to creditors); Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1023-
25 (Del. Ch. 2010) (indicating that parties may eliminate information rights in the alternative
entity context under the guise of fiduciary duties); R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run
Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (stating
that parties may waive judicial dissolution by contract); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No.
3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2009).
5. Tit. 6, § 18-1101(b). See also tit. 6, §17-1101(c). But see tit. 12, § 3809 (The Dela-
ware Statutory Trust Act defaults to trust law although the governing instrument may elimi-
nate duties and liability for breach of duties, but it may not eliminate the contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing).
6. See D.C. CODE § 29-802.06; 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (LexisNexis
2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 489.1201 (West 2009); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.296 (West 2010);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2054.4 (West 2012); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 3967 (2009); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-249-309 (2012); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.601 (West 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-606 (LexisNexis 2012) (to be repealed July 1, 2013 and superseded by
§§ 48-3-1201 through 48-3-1210).
7. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.03 (2011) (providing series definition without men-
tion of limitation of liabilities and no mention of limitation of liabilities for series elsewhere
in statute); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-231 (2011) (amended by 2012 Miss. Laws Ch. 382 (H.B.
1162); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-02.57 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. § 183.0504 (2011).
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series’ increasing popularity as the preferred structure among entities,
there is still considerable confusion as to how series function in general.
One aspect of confusion for practitioners utilizing the series structure is
the federal tax status of the series.  Some degree of this tax ambiguity is
now addressed in the September 2010 proposed Internal Revenue Code
Regulations on series.8  Notwithstanding the fact that the proposed regula-
tions are now available, there are a number of open questions with respect
to general use of a series.  In light of this uncertainty, this article details
some of the more significant provisions of the Delaware LLC series law
and its antecedent—the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (the “DSTA”).
The authors conclude that the Delaware series supplies a beneficial,
efficient use of a combined contractual Delaware entity form when pooled
with sensible, informed planning by sophisticated business attorneys.  Such
benefits are particularly noticeable in investment vehicles where managers
embark to minimize risk by diversifying the fund’s assets or receive fund-
ing with specific covenants attached that limit the acceptable uses of the
8. Series LLCs and Cell Companies, 75 Fed. Reg. 55699 [hereinafter Series LLCs and
Cell Companies] (proposed Sep. 14, 2010) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).  Under current law,
there is little specific guidance regarding whether for Federal tax purposes a series (or cell) is
treated as an entity separate from other series or the series LLC (or other cells or the cell
company, as the case may be), or whether the company and all of its series (or cells) should
be treated as a single entity.  Id. at 55699.  Under the proposed federal tax regulations, a
“series organization” is defined as a “juridical entity that establishes and maintains, or under
which is established and maintained, a series.  A series organization includes a series limited
liability company, series partnership, series trust, protected cell company, segregated cell
company, segregated portfolio company, and segregated account company.” Id. at 55702. A
series under the proposed regulations is defined as:
a segregated group of assets and liabilities that is established pursuant to a series statute
by agreement of a series organization.  A series includes a cell, segregated account, or
segregated portfolio, including a cell, segregated account, or segregated portfolio that is
formed under the insurance code of a jurisdiction or is engaged in an insurance business.
Id.
The Internal Revenue Bulletin also indicates:
Although some statutes creating series organizations permit an individual series to enter
into contracts, sue, be sued, and/or hold property in its own name, the IRS and the
Treasury Department do not believe that the failure of a statute to explicitly provide
these rights should alter the treatment of a domestic series as an entity formed under
local law. These attributes primarily involve procedural formalities and do not appear to
affect the substantive economic rights of series or their creditors with respect to their
property and liabilities. Even in jurisdictions where series may not possess these attrib-
utes, the statutory liability shields would still apply to the assets of a particular series,
provided the statutory requirements are satisfied. [Additionally] [t]he IRS and the Trea-
sury Department believe that domestic series should be classified as separate local law
entities based on the characteristics granted to them under the various series statutes.
However, except as specifically stated in the proposed regulations, a particular series
need not actually possess all of the attributes that its enabling statute permits it to pos-
sess . . . . The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that a domestic series should be
treated as a separate local law entity even if its business purpose, investment objective,
or ownership overlaps with that of other series or the series organization itself. Separate
state law entities may have common or overlapping business purposes, investment objec-
tives and ownership, but generally are still treated as separate local law entities for Fed-
eral tax purposes.  Id. at 55703.
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funds.  The series is not, however, for general practitioners who have the
occasional client wishing for the latest benefit Delaware has to offer its
investors.
To provide context, Parts II-IV of this article provide a brief overview
of how the series structure evolved and introduces the reader to the Dela-
ware Series.  Next, Part V of this article sheds light on the Delaware series
LLC and provides practitioners with a useful guide to facilitate forming
this specialized business entity.  Part VI answers some of the commonly
asked questions about a Delaware series.  Finally, Part VII of this article
addresses the common mistakes made by practitioners when forming a
Delaware LLC series.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SERIES
The concept of the series structure first arose in the context of the Del-
aware Business,9 now Statutory, Trust Act.10  The purpose of the Dela-
ware series was to allow persons managing, controlling or operating
certain business activities in a manner known at common law as a “busi-
ness trust” or “Massachusetts trust”11 to segregate similar assets.  In the
mutual fund industry, in particular, a single trust could be created and a
9. The original Delaware Business Trust Act was adopted in 1988. See S.B. No. 355,
134th Gen. Assemb., 66 Del. Laws 279 (1988). See also S.B. 452, 135th Gen. Assemb., 67 Del.
Laws 297 (1990).
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3826 (2012). For additional discussion on Delaware
trusts in general see Michael M. Gordon & Peter S. Gordon, Why is Everyone Talking About
Delaware Trusts?, GORDON, FOURNARIS & MAMMARELLA, P.A. (Sept., 2007), http://www.
gfmlaw.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/Why%20Is%20Everyone%20Talking%20About%20Dela
ware%20Trusts%20(00295992).pdf.
11. The Massachusetts Trust was a common law trust that first appeared in 1827.  A
“Massachusetts Business Trust“ is defined as “[a] business organization wherein property is
conveyed to trustees and managed for benefit of holders of certificates like corporate stock
certificates.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1127 (4th ed. 1968).  Using a trust estate as a busi-
ness entity is a practice that originated in Massachusetts. See id. at 1684.  The Massachusetts
Business Trust allowed the vesting [of] a business or certain real estate in a group of trustees,
who manage it for the benefit of the beneficial owners; the ownership of the latter is evi-
denced by negotiable (or transferable) shares. The trustees are elected by the shareholders,
or, in case of a vacancy, by the board of trustees. Provision is made in the agreement and
declaration of trust to the effect that when new trustees are elected, the trust estate shall vest
in them without further conveyance. The declaration of trust specifies the powers of the
trustees. They have a common seal; the board is organized with the usual officers of a board
of trustees; it is governed by by-laws; the officers have the usual powers of like corporate
officers; so far as practicable, the trustees in their collective capacity, are to carry on the
business under a specified name. The trustees may also hold shares as beneficiaries. Provision
may be made for the alteration or amendment of the agreement or declaration in a specified
manner. Id.
In the famous case of Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178 (1911), the Supreme Court held that
the Cushing Real Estate Trust, formed under trust law for the purpose of buying, improving,
and selling land and buildings, could not be taxed as a corporation since the trust had not
been organized under a United States law, such as a corporate statute, and did not have
perpetual existence (applying trust law – life in being plus 20 years).  With this ruling, the
Massachusetts trust organizational structure granted favorable tax treatment to the entity,
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE103.txt unknown Seq: 5  7-DEC-12 13:32
Fall 2012] The Delaware Series LLC 101
centralized management, limited liability for beneficial owners who did not participate in
management, and free transferability of ownership units. Id.
Other jurisdictions organized the “business trust” as a corporation so as to benefit from
the protections of limited liability, free transferability of stock, and centralized management.
See Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Modern Status of the Massachusetts or Business Trust, 88
A.L.R.3d 704 (1978).  The corporate form suffered from undesirable tax treatment and the
loss of the flexible attributes of the common law trust. Id.  The favorable tax treatment of the
Massachusetts trust is now largely gone due to changes in the IRC.  For example, Washington
defines its Massachusetts Trust as follows:
A Massachusetts trust is an unincorporated business association created at common law
by an instrument under which property is held and managed by trustees for the benefit
and profit of such persons as may be or may become the holders of transferable certifi-
cates evidencing beneficial interests in the trust estate, the holders of which certificates
are entitled to the same limitation of personal liability extended to stockholders of pri-
vate corporations.
Wash. Rev. Code § 23.90.020 (LexisNexis 2012).
The powers and duties of the Washington “Massachusetts Trust” are:
(1) Any Massachusetts trust desiring to do business in this state shall file with the secre-
tary of state a verified copy of the trust instrument creating such a trust and any amend-
ment thereto, the assumed business name, if any, and the names and addresses of its
trustees.
(2) Any person dealing with such Massachusetts trust shall be bound by the terms and
conditions of the trust instrument and any amendments thereto so filed.
(3) Any Massachusetts trust created under this chapter or entering this state pursuant
thereto shall pay such taxes and fees as are imposed by the laws, ordinances, and resolu-
tions of the state of Washington and any counties and municipalities thereof on domestic
and foreign corporations, respectively, on an identical basis therewith. In computing
such taxes and fees, the shares of beneficial interest of such a trust shall have the charac-
ter for tax purposes of shares of stock in private corporations.
(4) Any Massachusetts trust shall be subject to such applicable provisions of law, now or
hereafter enacted, with respect to domestic and foreign corporations, respectively, as
relate to the issuance of securities, filing of required statements or reports, service of
process, general grants of power to act, right to sue and be sued, limitation of individual
liability of shareholders, rights to acquire, mortgage, sell, lease, operate and otherwise to
deal in real and personal property, and other applicable rights and duties existing under
the common law and statutes of this state in a manner similar to those applicable to
domestic and foreign corporations.
(5) The secretary of state, director of licensing, and the department of revenue of the
state of Washington are each authorized and directed to prescribe binding rules and
regulations applicable to said Massachusetts trusts consistent with this chapter.
WASH. REV. CODE § 23.90.040 (West 2012).
In filing for formation with the Washington Secretary of State the following sample format is
suggested by the authors:
Pursuant to the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE § 23.90 (1994), the undersigned “Massa-
chusetts Trust” existing in the state of ___________________ desiring to do business in the
State of Washington does hereby submit the following statements:
1. Name (and the name under which it will do business in the State of Washington)
2. Created under the laws of _______________ state
3. Date of creation and term of existence
4. Address of principal office in state under the laws of which it was created
5. Purpose(s) which it proposes to pursue in the transaction of business in Washington
State.
6. Name and address of its trustees
7. Name of the appointed registered agent/registered office address residing in Washing-
ton State
8. The number of beneficial shares or units.
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distinct series of the trust could be formed for each asset class within the
trust.12  Specifically, high-yield investments could be allocated to one class
of the trust; ten-year notes with a lower performance earmarked to a sec-
ond series; and five-year low-interest investments allocated to a third
series.
The reason for the series mutual fund was simple: a single entity could
be created—typically a Massachusetts trust for tax purposes—and this le-
gal person could achieve centralized management (a trustee or board of
trustees), the ownership interests were freely transferable (like stock), the
beneficial owners had limited liability so long as they did not participate in
management, and the trust could then operate under a single registration
for purposes of the Investment Company Act of 1940.13  Other jurisdic-
tions elected to utilize the corporation to achieve the same result—the
downside being double taxation and decreased internal flexibility.14  The
series concept solved these downsides by providing a new entity structure
that incorporated the manageability of assets assigned by series under a
single umbrella entity.  The structure was first codified in the former Dela-
ware Business Trust Act.  However, the most popular series formation, the
Delaware LLC series is codified in Delaware’s ever-popular LLC Act
(“DLLCA”).15
III. OPENING CONSIDERATIONS
This article focuses solely upon the Delaware LLC series due to its
originality and national popularity.  However, since its creation, nine other
jurisdictions have followed Delaware and adopted “series” legislation: (1)
the District of Columbia;16 (2) Illinois;17 (3) Iowa;18 (4) Nevada;19 (5)
12. See Chermside, supra note 11.
13. See Nat’l Sec. Series-Indus. Stock Series v. Comm’r, 13 T.C.  884 (T.C. 1949) (hold-
ing that several series within a single investment trust could be treated as separate taxable
entities).  Although the trust may file a single Investment Company filing, each series is gen-
erally considered a separate investment company. Id.
14. See Chermside, supra note 11.
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2012).
16. D.C. CODE § 29-802.06 (2012).
17. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (LexisNexis 2007).
18. Compare IOWA CODE ANN. § 489.1205 (West 2009) (superseding § 490.A.305);
with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (following Delaware series except that termination by
consent of members requires consent of all members rather than 2/3 percentage of members
required in Delaware where termination is based on consent of members).
19. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.296, 89.210, 80.110 (West 2010) (similar to Delaware
series except that series provisions are found throughout statute instead of in one central
location, making it more difficult for practitioner use; Nevada imposes an initial filing fee of
$75.00 for an LLC and separate filing fees for each series; an annual filing fee of $125.00 is
required for each series, a money-enhancer for Nevada).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE103.txt unknown Seq: 7  7-DEC-12 13:32
Fall 2012] The Delaware Series LLC 103
Oklahoma;20 (6) Tennessee;21 (7) Texas;22 (8) Utah;23 and (9) Puerto
Rico.24  For an offshore series LLC, the Republic of the Marshall Island
permits the creation of series LLCs.25 Additionally, several jurisdictions
make reference to the series concept; however, these states do not provide
the internal protections offered by the Delaware series.26  Moreover, se-
ries legislation, similar to that found in Delaware, has recently been pro-
posed in the State of Kansas.27
IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE DELAWARE SERIES
As discussed above, the Delaware series began its life as a signature
feature in the former Delaware Business Trust Act28 (now the Delaware
Statutory Trust Act or “DSTA”) where transactions generally involved
mutual funds or highly financed asset securitizations. In this industry, in-
vestors found it advantageous to “group,” “class,” or place into “series”
real estate investment mortgages, real estate mortgage income invest-
ments, or similar assets that were to be used as securitization devices.
For example, consider an investment manager who is charged with su-
pervising municipal bonds and governmental securities as well as high-
yield, high-risk bonds.  The manager likely will seek to separate the invest-
ments into distinct “units” or “series.”  In this manner, any profits or
losses are allocated expressly to owners who selected that stratagem.  As a
fund manager, this organizational infrastructure is logical, efficient, and
logistically convenient since a series allows the segregation of the types of
income investment devices into individual series and the subsequent allo-
cation of income from the identified investments to express individualized
investment stratagem of beneficiaries, or trustees.
The series seemingly anticipates separate record keeping for these di-
versified investment devices with notice of the series in the certificate of
20. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2054.4 (West 2012) (following Delaware approach).
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-309 (2006).
22. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.601 (West 2009).
23. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-606 – 616 (LexisNexis 2012) (to be repealed July 1, 2013
and superseded by §§ 48-3-1201 through 48-3-1210). (following Delaware separateness test,
however, like Illinois and Delaware 2007 amendments, allows a series to contract but does
not consider the series to be an entity; a foreign application requires identification of protec-
tions available in the Utah act as well as any different protections not found in the Utah act).
24. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 3967 (2009).
25. Limited Liability Company Act, 52 MIRC Part IV § 79 (1996) (Marsh. Is.).
26. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4351 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. § 322B.03 (2011); Miss.
Code Ann. § 79-29-210, 214 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-02.55 (West 2011); WIS. STAT.
§ 183.0504 (2006).
27. See 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws 353-58.
28. The Delaware Business Trust Act, originally enacted in 1988, did not contain any
“series” language.  The true Delaware series was brought into the Act effective July 5, 1990.
See S.B. 452, 135th Gen. Assemb., 67 Del. Laws 297 (1990).
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trust that forms the statutory trust of record.29  However, the DSTA does
not require “records and notices” for the series in order for an internal
limitation of liability to attach between and among series, nor does it re-
quire notice of the creation of a series in the certificate of trust.30  In this
manner, the DSTA series is quite simplified in contrast to the LLC
series.31
The DLLCA, enacted in 1992, adopted series language in 1996 as well
as the “class or group” formulation set forth in the Delaware Revised Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act, (“DRUPA”).32  The DLLCA series provi-
sion is significantly more detailed in its description of the series than is in
the original Delaware Business Trust Act.33  The descriptive language of
the DLLCA series serves to provide notice as to how to safeguard the
separate features of each series for the purpose of limiting the liability of a
series obligation to that series’ assets.34  There is no legislative record indi-
cating that either the series language set forth in the present DSTA or the
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3810 (2012).  The series may be set forth in the gov-
erning instrument of the statutory trust–a document that is not a public record.  Tit. 12,
§ 3812.
30. Tit. 12, § 3812.
31. In 2006, 96,831 new LLCs were formed in Delaware compared with 34,733 new
corporations.  In 2007, before the market crash, that number increased to 111,820 compared
with 35,700 new corporations.  For the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, LLC growth per year was
81,523, 70,274, and 78,000, respectively.  For those same years, new corporate filings were
29,501, 24,955, and 27,500, respectively. Series LLC filings jumped to 2.5 percent of all LLC
filings by 2007.  That percentage of series LLC filings remains stable in 2011.  New formation
of statutory trust from 2003 to the Fall of 2010 grew as follows: 1,722; 1,913; 3,200; 3,868;
4,449; 2,581; 1,312; 1,200, respectively. See infra Appendix.  Because sophisticated, highly-
funded deals were commonly used by Delaware limited partnerships, the Delaware Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (“DRULPA”) was amended in 1996, effective in 1997, to
add the concept of series to its arsenal of contractual features. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-
218 (2012).  The DRULPA was revised in 1996 to include a series of “limited partners, gen-
eral partners, [or] partnership interests” provision. Id.  However, the term “series” was not
added to the Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“DRUPA”).  The DRUPA does
permit “classes and groups” of partners with such “rights, powers and duties” as the partner-
ship agreement sets forth. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 6, § 15-407(a) (20012).  The DRUPA adopts
a “classes and groups” formulation for voting purposes. Id.  The DRUPA does not have a
series limitation on liabilities provision.  The only “notice” series procedures under DRUPA
exist through the partnership agreement, filing a statement of partnership existence, and fil-
ing for LLP status pursuant to title 6, section 15-1001 of the Delaware Code. Tit. 6, § 15-1001
(2012).  Because series are intended to create “internal liability shields,” it is highly unlikely
that any court would enforce a “class or group” as a series under DRUPA, even if filed as an
LLP.  This result makes sense from a policy perspective since the statutory power to create a
limitation on liabilities for a true statutory series is absent.  Of course, the DRUPA does
clearly state that the policy of the Act is to “give maximum effect to the principle of freedom
of contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements.”  Tit. 6, § 15-103(d).
DRUPA does not, however, create a statutory series limitation on liability. See Tit. 6, § 15-
101 et seq. (making no mention of any such limitation).
32. See Tit. 6, § 18-215(e).
33. Compare tit. 6, § 18-215, with tit. 12, § 3806.
34. See tit. 6, § 18-215.
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DLLCA was intended to mean that an individual series serves as an inde-
pendent and distinct “entity” within an “entity” – a current hot topic
within the unincorporated organization marketplace.35
V. A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE DELAWARE SERIES LLC
A. The Delaware LLC Act
Delaware amended the DLLCA in 1996, effective 1997, to include a
series provision.36  The amended section is titled: “Series of Members,
Managers, LLC Interests, or Assets.”37  Unlike its counterpart in the
DSTA, the DLLCA: (1) creates a statutory provision for a “series” of
members, managers, LLC interests and assets independent of the Act’s
default managerial section;38 (2) permits “series to carry on any lawful
purposes . . . whether or not for profit[;]”39 (3) creates a “records and
notice” system so that “debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses in-
curred, contracted for or otherwise existing” of separate series are en-
forceable only against that series (the “limitation on liabilities”) and not
against the LLC nor other series within the LLC;40  and (4) provides for
the future creation of classes or groups of members or managers, including
“a class or group of the series of LLC interests that was not previously
outstanding.”41  Also, in the 2006 amendments to the DLLCA, the term
“series” was added to the definition of “person” so that “person” now
includes: “any other individual or entity (or series thereof) in its own or any
representative capacity.”42  The 2007 amendments to the DLLCA made
several changes that will be addressed within the body of the discussion
below.43
B. A Practitioner’s Guide to the Delaware Series LLC
This section provides practitioners with a guide to the Delaware series
LLC.  In particular, this section focuses on the provisions of section 18-215
35. See, e.g., What is a Series LLC?, NOLO.COM, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclope
dia/what-is-series-llc.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (erroneously referring to each series,
within the parent series, as separate entities). See also Carol R. Goforth, The Series LLC,
and a Series of Difficult Questions, 60 ARK. L. REV. 385, 397-99 (2007) (noting that the issue
of whether each series will be treated as separate legal entities for bankruptcy purposes re-
mains unresolved).
36. See tit. 6, § 18-215.
37. 76 Del. Laws Ch. 105 (S.B. 96) (2007); See also tit. 6, § 18-215 (original version at
70 Del. Laws ch. 360 (1996)).
38. See tit. 6, § 18-215(a).
39. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c).
40. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
41. See tit. 6, § 18-215(e).
42. Tit. 6, § 18-101(12) (emphasis added).
43. Certain re-numbering of DLLCA resulted from the 2007 amendments, effective
August 1, 2007.  76 Del. Laws Ch. 105 (S.B. 96) (2007); See also tit. 6, § 18-215 (original
version at 70 Del. Laws, ch. 360 (1996)).
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of the DLLCA.  Notably, practitioners may reference this section for in-
formation on, among other things, how to form a series, the powers and
authorities of a series, the management of a series, and investor’s rights to
access books and records.  This section also sheds light on issues pertaining
to fiduciary duties, terminating and winding up a series, and extra-territo-
rial concerns.
1. FORMATION OF THE SERIES
The core stages of formation according to sections 18-215(a)-(b) are:
(1) the allocation of LLC property or obligations or separate allocation of
profits and losses to the specified property or obligations with each series
possibly having a separate business purpose or investment objective;44 (2)
a method set forth to maintain separate and distinct records concerning
the allocation of the LLC assets from one series to another;45 and (3) a
notice of the limitation on liabilities between and among series expressed
in the certificate of formation of the LLC.46  The determining essence of
the DLLCA series is “separateness”—separateness as to allocations, spi-
noff of economic rights, record keeping, and liability shields.47
As mentioned above, the first and second core stages of forming a Del-
aware series LLC, pursuant to section 18-215, is a “separateness” require-
ment.  With respect to the first core element, the forming of an LLC
begins by allocating property or obligations, or profits and losses to spe-
cific property or obligations, to individual series (each of which may have
a distinct purpose).48  The second core stage is the maintaining of separate
and distinct records concerning the allocation of the LLC assets from one
series to another.49  In particular, a 2007 amendment to section 18-215(b)
clarified that the term “records” includes documents of whatever nature,
so long as the records “reasonably identify [the series’] assets, including by
specific listing, category, type, quantity, computational or allocational
formula or procedure (including a percentage or share of any asset or as-
sets) or by any other method where the identity of such assets is objec-
tively determinable.”50  The objective of this amendment was simply to
clarify that the purpose or nature of the record was not as important as its
function in identifying segregated assets in an objectively determinable
manner.51
44. See tit. 6, § 18-215(a).
45. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
46. See id.
47. See tit. 6, § 18-215.
48. See tit. 6, § 18-215(a).
49. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
50. Id.
51. See S.B. 95, 144th Gen. Assemb., 1st  Reg. Sess., 76 Del. Laws 104 (2007); S.B. 96,
144th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., 76 Del. Laws 2007 105 (2007).
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A third core stage in creating a Delaware LLC series is a “notice” re-
quirement.52  In order for the “separateness” of a series to be enforceable
and the limitation of liability confined to each single series, section 18-
215(b) demands that “notice” of a “series LLC” be included in a certifi-
cate of formation of the LLC.53  “Notice in a certificate of formation of
the limitation on liabilities of a series as referenced in this subsection”54 is
considered sufficient, whether or not a series is created at the time the
LLC is formed.55  Further, the notice mandated by section 18-215(b) does
not require reference to any specific series, unlike the series in a Delaware
statutory trust.56
The completion of the three core stages discussed above results in a
limitation on liabilities that attaches to the assets or property of a series
that is formed in compliance with the “notice” and “records” requirements
of section 18-215(b).57  Thus, if the three core elements are established,
the limited liability protection of the series is enforceable against third
parties.
2. SERVICE OF PROCESS
In all Delaware civil actions or proceedings involving the LLC’s busi-
ness or a violation by a manager or liquidating trustee of a duty owed to
the LLC, a manager or liquidating trustee of an LLC may be served with
process.58  Such a manager or a liquidating trustee may also be served with
process, “whether or not the manager or the liquidating trustee is a man-
ager or a liquidating trustee at the time suit is commenced.”59  If a man-
ager or liquidating trustee acts in such capacity, the trustee or manager
consents that the resident agent of the LLC is such person’s agent for pur-
pose of service of process upon that person.60  Once service has been
made, responsive filings are processed through the Secretary of State, the
Prothonotary and the Register in Chancery.61 These same rules would ap-
ply to a manager or a liquidating trustee of a series in liquidation.
52. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).  It is important to note that notice is not required to form a
Delaware LLC series; however, as warned above, notice is required to ensure the limitiation
on liability is confined to each individual series. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id.  The fact that a series does not have to be in existence at the time “notice” of
the series is provided for in the certificate of formation allows the creation of what is known
as a “shelf” series - i.e., a blank series that may be “filled in” at a later date according to the
limited liability agreement of the company. Id; KEATINGE AND CONAWAY ON CHOICE BUS.
ENT. § 3:7 (2012).
56. Compare tit. 6, § 18-215, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3810 (2012).
57. Tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
58. Tit. 6, § 18-109(a).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Tit. 6, § 18-109(b).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE103.txt unknown Seq: 12  7-DEC-12 13:32
108 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 2:97
A manager or member to an LLC may also consent, through a written
LLC agreement or other writing, to being subject to the nonexclusive ju-
risdiction of the courts in a specific jurisdiction or an arbitration tribunal in
a specified jurisdiction.62  Alternatively, a member or manager may con-
sent to be bound by “the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Delaware
or to the exclusivity of arbitration in a specified jurisdiction or the state of
Delaware[.]”63  If a member who is not a manager has not agreed to arbi-
trate in Delaware, however, such member may not waive its right to sue in
the courts of Delaware “with respect to matters involving the internal af-
fairs of the [LLC].”64
3. A SERIES’ POWERS AND AUTHORITY
In addition to the new language at subsection (b), a new subsection (c)
was set out in the 2007 amendments to section 18-215.65  New section 18-
215(c) provides:
A series established in accordance with subsection (b) of this section may
carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity, whether or not for profit,
with the exception of the business of banking as defined in § 126 of Title 8.
Unless otherwise provided in a LLC agreement, a series established in accor-
dance with subsection (b) of this section shall have the power and capacity to,
in its own name, contract, hold title to assets (including real, personal and
intangible property), grant liens and security interests, and sue and be sued.66
Under the 2007 amendments, therefore, the “person” defined as a “se-
ries” has the capacity to contract in its own name, hold title to real estate
and assets, sue and be sued, and create security interests and grant liens.67
The nature of that “person,” however, appears to be derivative of the en-
tity whose property it holds, i.e., the LLC, not the series.68  Stated differ-
ently, the “LLC” and the “series” are “persons” within the definitions,69
62. Tit. 6, § 18-109(d).
63. Id.
64. Id.  It is important to note that the United States District Court recently deemed
the Delaware Court of Chancery’s confidential “arbitration” proceedings unconstitutional.
Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., D. Del. C.A. No.
1:11-1015 (Aug. 30, 2012).  An appeal from this decision is promised. See Kevin F. Brady,
Confidential Court of Chancery Arbitration Proceedings Found Unconstitutional—Violate
qualified Right to Access, DELAWARE CORPORATE & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION Blog
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2012/08/articles/other-court-decisions/con
fidential-court-of-chancery-arbitration-proceedings-found-unconstitutional-violate-qualified-
right-of-access/.
65. 76 Del. Laws Ch. 105 (S.B. 96) (2007); see also Tit. 6, § 18-215 (original version at
70 Del. Laws ch. 360 (1996).
66. Tit. 6, § 18-215(c).
67. See id.
68. See tit. 6, § 18-201 (providing for the formation of a Delaware limited liablity com-
pany); See tit. 6, § 18-215 (“A limited liablity company agreement may establish or provide
for the establishment of 1 or more designated series of members, managers, limited liablity
company interests or assets.”) (emphasis added).
69. Tit. 6, § 18-101(12).
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but only the “LLC” is considered “a separate legal entity” distinct from its
members.70  As a matter of sound business practice, foreign filings, grant-
ing of security interests, or recordation of liens on public records should be
(or must be in the case of a security interest)71 accomplished by execution
as a series of a named LLC rather than by the series solely.  Such an exe-
cution is not intended as an agency filing for the LLC, but only for the
series itself.
4. MANAGEMENT OF A SERIES
Once a basic series is formed, section 18-215 permits the creation of
“classes or groups” of members or managers associated with a series “hav-
ing such rights, powers and duties” as contracted for in the LLC agree-
ment, including the creation of future groups or classes associated with a
series having rights that are senior to those already in existence.72  The
LLC agreement may also provide for the amendment of the company
LLC agreement “without the vote or approval of any member or manager
or class or group of members or managers,” including the creation of a
class or group of the series of LLC interests that did not previously exist.73
The LLC agreement may also provide that any member or class or group
of members associated with a series has no voting rights.74  Voting by
members or managers may be done separately or with all or any class or
group of members or managers associated with a series.75  Voting may also
be on a per capita, number, financial interest, group, class or other agreed
upon basis.76  Thus, the LLC Agreement may provide for any manage-
ment rights or duties to vest in members, managers or both in whatever
manner agreed upon.
In the absence of an agreement, management of an individual series is
vested in the members according to each member’s percentage or other
70. Tit. 6, § 18-201(b) (emphasis added). Under proposed federal tax regulations, a
“series organization” is defined as a “juridical entity that establishes and maintains, or under
which is established and maintained, a series . . . .  A series organization includes a series
limited liability company, series partnership, series trust, protected cell company, segregated
cell company, segregated portfolio company, or segregated account company.”  Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(5)(viii), 75 Fed. Reg. 55699 (Sept. 14, 2010).  A “series” under the pro-
posed regulations is defined as “a segregated group of assets and liabilities that is established
pursuant to a series statute . . . by agreement of a series organization.  A series includes a
series, cell, segregated account, or segregated portfolio, including a cell, segregated account,
or segregated portfolio that is formed under the insurance code of a jurisdiction or is in
engaged in an insurance business.” Id.
71. See tit. 6, §§ 9-102(70), 9-503(a)(1) (requiring a “registered owner” for the creation
and perfection of a security interest and that the LLC itself, not the series, satisfies the “regis-
tered owner” definition).
72. Tit. 6, § 18-215(d).
73. Tit. 6, § 18-215(d).
74. See id.
75. See tit. 6, § 18-215(e).
76. See id.
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interest in the series’ profits owned at that time.77  Members owning more
than 50 percent of the profits control the decision-making of the series in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary.78  If a manager is appointed
to manage the series, management is conducted as set forth in the LLC
agreement.79  Termination of a manager likewise will follow as set forth in
the LLC agreement.80  Unless otherwise provided in the LLC agreement,
termination of a manager in one series does not, in itself, terminate the
manager in another series or as manager of the LLC itself.81
5. INFORMATION RIGHTS IN A SERIES
Section 18-215 does not contain an independent provision addressing
information rights.  Section 18-215(e) states that: “[an] LLC agreement
may provide for classes or groups of members or managers associated with
a series having such relative rights, powers and duties as the LLC agree-
ment may provide.”82  Pursuant to section 18-215(e), therefore, a Dela-
ware LLC agreement could limit information rights of members associated
with a series to only those members and not to members associated with
other series.  In the absence of an agreement, section 18-305 controls, al-
lowing members access to certain information and records by default.83
6. DISTRIBUTIONS IN A SERIES
Distributions with respect to a series are made in accordance with the
terms of the LLC agreement.84  However, distributions shall not be made





82. Tit. 6, § 18-305(e) (emphasis added).
83. See Tit. 6, § 18-305(a), which permits members access to:
(1) True and full information regarding the status of the business and financial condition
of the limited liability company; (2) Promptly after becoming available, a copy of the
limited liability company’s federal, state and local income tax returns for each year; (3)
A current list of the name and last known business, residence or mailing address of each
ember and manager; (4) A copy of any written limited liability company agreement and
certificate of formation and all amendments thereto, together with executed copies of
any written powers of attorney pursuant to which the limited liability company agree-
ment and any certificate and all amendments thereto have been executed; (5) True and
full information regarding the amount of cash and a description and statement of the
agreed value of any other property or service contributed by each member and which
each member has agreed to contribute in the future, and the date on which each became
a member; and (6) Other information regarding the affairs of the limited liability com-
pany as is just and reasonable.
See also Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1023-25 (allowing for the elimination of information rights in
the alternative entity context).
84. See tit. 6, § 18-215(i).
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to the extent that . . . , after giving effect to the distribution,85 all liabilities of
[the] series . . . exceed the fair value of the assets [of the] series, except that
the fair value of property of the series that is subject to a liability for which the
recourse of creditors is limited [will only] be included in the assets . . . to the
extent that the fair value of that property exceeds that liability.”86
The term “distribution” as used in section 18-215(i) does not include “rea-
sonable compensation for present or past services or reasonable payments
made in the ordinary course of business pursuant to a bona fide plan or
other benefits program.”87 If a member receives a distribution in violation
of section 18-215(i), and knew at the time of the distribution that it was
wrongful, the member is liable to the series for the amount of the distribu-
tion.88  If a member is obligated to make a distribution pursuant to an
agreement, that agreement prevails whether or not the member had
knowledge of a wrongful distribution.89  Generally, if an action for a
wrongful distribution is not brought within three years of the distribution,
any action for monetary recovery from a member who received the distri-
bution is precluded.90
7. ASSIGNMENT OF INTERESTS IN A SERIES
If a member assigns all of its LLC interest with respect to a series, that
member ceases to be a member of the series unless provided otherwise in
the LLC agreement.91  If the member is the last member of the series, the
default rule is that the series is not terminated by the cessation of the
member, unless provided for by the LLC agreement.92  In addition, the
termination of the member as to one series does not, by itself, cause the
member to cease being a member of another series or of the LLC itself.93
These provisions set forth default rules that may be modified by the par-
ties to the LLC agreement.94
85. This does not include “liabilities to members on account of their limited liability
company interests with respect to the series or liability for which the recourse of creditors is
limited to specified property of [the] series.” Id.




90. See tit. 6, § 18-607(c). See also tit. 6, § 18-215(i) (stating that there is no liability for
a member who has no knowledge of the wrongfulness of the distribution at the time it is
made).
91. See tit. 6, § 18-215(i).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (“It is the policy of [the DLLCA] to give the maximum
effect to the principle of freedom of contract . . . .”).
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8. NATURE OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INTEREST—
ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY INTEREST
An interest in an LLC is personal property and does not grant a right
in specific property of the LLC.95  For example, if member A contributes
$50,000 to an LLC and member B contributes real estate worth $100,000,
the LLC now owns property valued at $150,000, and members A and B
respectively own “interests” in the LLC - not the property of the LLC.
The members of the LLC have the right to determine their respective
“profits and loss interests” in the LLC.96  If the members fail to do so,
profits and losses will be allocated on the basis of the agreed value (as
provided in the company records) of the contributions made by each
member to the extent the contribution has been received by the LLC and
has not been returned.97 In this manner, if A and B did not independently
agree to profit and loss sharing and the LLC had $75,000 to distribute, A
would receive $25,000 and B would receive $50,000.
If A assigned her interest to her daughter, A’s daughter would have no
right to participate in the management of the LLC except as provided in
the LLC agreement, or unless A’s daughter: (1) receives unanimous con-
sent of the remaining members;98 and (2) complies with any other proce-
dure set forth in the LLC agreement.99  In addition, an assignment does
not grant member rights to an assignee.100  Instead, an assignee is only
entitled to receive the distributions or allocations of income, gains, loss or
similar items to which the assignor was entitled.101 Once an assignment is
95. See tit. 6, § 18-701.
96. See tit. 6, § 18-503.
97. See id.
98. See. tit. 6, § 18-702(a).
99. See id.
100. See tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(1).  In Eureka VIII LLC v. Niagara Falls Holdings LLC, the
court noted that the policy that underlies subdivision (b)(3) of this section:
[I]s that “it is far more tolerable to have to suffer a new passive co-investor one did not
choose than to endure a new co-manager without consent.”  That is particularly the case
where, as here, an LLC is closely held.  When an LLC is closely held, “members often
work closely with co-owners and, therefore, prefer to select their associates.”  Transfers
of membership interests, then, “introduce potential new conflicts of interest” and
“change and perhaps complicate decision-making.”
Eureka VIII LLC v. Niagara Falls Holdings LLC, 899 A.2d 95, 115 (Del. Ch. 2006) (citations
omitted).
Additionally, the court stated:
Thus, the statutes reinforce the remedial conclusions clearly suggested by the provisions
of the LLC Agreement [in the instant case] that were breached: [plaintiff] should not be
bound to manage and operate an LLC with a co-member with which it never intended or
agreed to go into business. To redress the situation [plaintiff] finds itself in, it is appropri-
ate that [defendant] be remitted to holding merely the economic interest of an assignee
of a members’ interest in [the] [r]edevelopment [company].  Id.
101. Tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(2).  A provision in an LLC agreement was held to be an ipso
facto clause vis-a-vis an assignee such that the default rules granting assignee distribution
rights under § 18-702(2) governed.  Northrop Gruman Tech. Servs. v. Shaw Group, Inc. (In re
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made, the assigning member ceases to be a member and ceases to have the
authority to exercise any power as a member.102  If the assignment is
solely structured as a pledge, a grant of a security interest, a lien or similar
encumbrance against the LLC interest, the assigning member does not
cease to be a member unless otherwise provided in the LLC agreement.103
Further, restrictions on assignments of LLC interests are enforceable in
Delaware despite contrary provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”).104
A judgment creditor of a member or of a member’s assignee may apply
to the Court of Chancery105 for a charging order against the interest.106  If
the interest is charged, the judgment creditor has only the right to receive
any distribution to which the judgment debtor would otherwise have been
entitled to receive with respect to the LLC interest.107  The charging order
is the exclusive remedy108 for a judgment creditor of a member or of a
member’s assignee and no creditor has any right to obtain possession of
the LLC’s property.109  Stated differently, the charging order does not en-
title the judgment creditor to be substituted for, or stand in the shoes of,
the member whose interest is so charged.  The latter rule follows because
the LLC, like its partnership counterparts, is a contractual entity that per-
mits its owners to choose with whom they desire to do business.110
9. TERMINATION AND WINDING UP OF A SERIES
A series may be terminated without causing the dissolution of the LLC
and does not affect the limitation on liabilities of such series.111  A series is
terminated and its affairs wound up upon the dissolution of the LLC or
upon the first  occurrence of any of the following: (1) the passage of a time
IT Group, Inc.), 302 B.R. 483, 487 (D. Del. 2003). See also Milford Power Co., LLC v. PDC
Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d 738 (Del. Ch. 2004).
102. See tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3).
103. See tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3).
104. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(g) (providing that §§ 9-406 and 9-408 of the UCC do not apply
to interests in LLCs and partnerships.).
105. See tit. 6, § 18-703(f) (giving the Court of Chancery jurisdiction to hear matters
involving charging orders).  In a recent Delaware Supreme Court ruling, creditors of a Dela-
ware LLC did not have derivative standing to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
managers of an insolvent LLC.  CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Del. 2011).  Since
the Supreme Court’s holding was founded on a lack of statutory standing, the Bax decision
has potentially far-reaching effect in curtailing creditor claims against LLCs as well as series
of LLCs.
106. See tit. 6, § 18-703.
107. See tit. 6, § 18-703(f).
108. See tit. 6, § 18-703(d).
109. See tit. 6, § 18-703(e).
110. See tit. 6 § 18-1101(b) (“It is the policy of [the DLLCA] to give the maximum
effect to the principle of freedom of contract.”).
111. See tit. 6, § 18-215(k).
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set forth in the LLC agreement;112 (2) the happening of an event specified
in the LLC agreement;113 (3) the affirmative vote or written consent of the
members or class or group of members associated with the series who own
more than two-thirds of the then-current percentage or other interest in
the profits of the series of the LLC;114 or (4) the termination of the series
by the Court of Chancery whenever it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business of the series in conformity with the LLC agree-
ment.115  An LLC agreement may alter the rules for termination as well as
the vote necessary to cause the termination of a series.116
Unless otherwise provided in an LLC agreement, a series may be
wound up by: (1) a manager associated with a series who has not wrong-
fully terminated the series; or if none; (2) the members associated with the
series; (3) a person approved by the members associated with the series;
(4) each class or group associated with the series; (5) members who own
more that 50 percent of the then current percentage or other interest in
the profits of the series of all the members associated with the series; or
(6) the members in each class or group associated with the series as appro-
priate.117  Upon a showing of cause, the Court of Chancery may wind up
the affairs of a series and appoint a liquidating trustee upon the applica-
tion of any member or manager118 associated with a series or that mem-
ber’s personal representative or assignee.119  The persons winding up the
affairs of the series may, in the name, and on behalf of, the LLC and the
series, take all actions necessary to settle and close the series’ business,
including providing for the claims and obligations of the series and distrib-
uting series assets as provided for in the DLLCA.120  Actions taken pursu-
ant to section 18-215(l) and section 18-804 to wind up the series will not
affect the liability of members or impose liability on a liquidating
trustee.121
10. FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
WITH A SERIES
If a foreign LLC registering to do business in Delaware is governed by
an LLC agreement that establishes designated series of members, manag-
112. See tit. 6, § 18-215(k)(1).
113. See tit. 6, § 18-215(k)(2).
114. See tit. 6, § 18-215(k)(3).
115. See tit. 6, § 18-215(k)(4).
116. See tit. 6, § 18-215(k).
117. See tit. 6, § 18-215(l).
118. See H.B. 338 Section 6, 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2012).
119. See tit. 6, § 18-215(l).
120. See id.
121. See id.
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ers, LLC interests, or assets,122 the foreign LLC’s application for registra-
tion must state that the foreign LLC has separate rights, powers, or duties
with respect to specified property or obligations of the foreign LLC, or has
profits and losses associated with specified property or obligations of the
LLC.123
In addition, the foreign limited liability company shall state on such applica-
tion whether the debts, liabilities and obligations incurred, contracted for or
otherwise existing with respect to a particular series . . . shall be enforceable
against the assets of such series only, and not against the assets of the foreign
limited liability company generally or any other series thereof, and whether
any of the debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses . . . [of] the foreign lim-
ited liability company generally or another other series thereof [are enforcea-
ble against that series].124
The question arises whether subsection 18-215(n) is a notice require-
ment for foreign series LLCs doing business in Delaware or whether the
subsection is intended to provide substantive recognition of foreign series
LLCs.  Typically, foreign registrations serve the purpose of providing no-
tice to the domestic jurisdiction of the presence of the foreign entity as
well as the nature and form of that entity.125  As a matter of comity, courts
generally recognize the organic law of the jurisdiction under which an en-
tity is created, formed, or otherwise comes into existence.126  This theory,
commonly known as the “internal affairs doctrine,” governs the affairs of
the entity and its owners and managers inter se.127
Application of the internal affairs doctrine may extend into the rights
of third parties against the entity if an attempt is being made to impose
personal liability upon members.128  However, it seems unlikely that sec-
tion 18-215(n) requires, for example, a Delaware court to recognize an
Illinois series LLC solely because of a registration under section 18-215(n).
Yet, principles of comity strongly suggest that a Delaware court would ap-
ply the governing law of a foreign entity independent of the failure of that
entity to register to do business in Delaware, at least where that foreign
122. The term “assets” was added with the 2007 amendments to § 18-215(n).  76 Del.
Laws Ch. 105 (S.B. 96) (2007); see also tit. 6, § 18-215(n) (original version at 70 Del. Laws ch.
360 (1996).
123. See tit. 6, § 18-215(n).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., tit. 6, § 18-201 (establishing the requirements necessary to file a certificate
of formation).
126. See, e.g., In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 729 A.2d 851, 865-
66 (Del. Ch. 1998) (discussing the internal affairs doctrine in the corporate context).
127. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (“The internal affairs doctrine is
a conflict of law principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or be-
tween the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders . . . .”).
128. See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108,
1115–18 (Del. 2005) (applying Delaware law to a dispute against a Delaware corporation).
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entity is a defendant in a Delaware court.129  As to the contrary ques-
tion—whether a non-Delaware court would recognize the Delaware series
where the foreign jurisdiction has no enabling series legislation—one case
has answered in the affirmative.130
11. MODIFICATION OR ELIMINATION OF DUTIES AND
LIABILITIES IN A LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY AGREEMENT
Section 18-1101(b) states the general policy of the DLLCA—that the
principle of freedom of contract is to be given “maximum effect.”131  It is
also the policy of the DLLCA to enforce LLC agreements.132
In Delaware, members of LLC agreements have the right to expand,
restrict or eliminate duties (including fiduciary duties) owed to an LLC or
to another member, manager, or another person that is a party to or is
otherwise bound by the company agreement.133  The LLC agreement may
not, however, eliminate the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.134
In addition, a member, manager or other person is not liable to an
LLC or to another member, manager or another person that is a party to
an LLC agreement for breach of fiduciary duty for the member’s, man-
ager’s or other person’s good faith reliance on provisions of the company’s
LLC Agreement.135  The exculpation under subsection 1101(d) is for lia-
bility for breach of a fiduciary duty, not the elimination of that duty.136
As for contract liability, subsection 1101(e) provides that an LLC
agreement may limit or eliminate all liabilities for breach of contract and
breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a member, manager or
other person to an LLC or to another member, manager or other person
that is bound to an LLC agreement.137  The LLC agreement may not,
however, limit or eliminate liability for any bad faith violation of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.138
129. See, e.g., Hamilton Partners, L.P. v. Englard, 11 A.3d 1180, 1217-18 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“Delaware has a related and equally important interest in affording comity to the courts of
other jurisdictions when a dispute arises under foreign business law. . . . If we expect that
other sovereigns will respect our state’s overriding interest in the interpretation and enforce-
ment of our entity laws, we must show reciprocal respect.”).
130. See GxG Mgmt. LLC, v. Young Bros. & Co., No. 05-162-B-K, 2007 WL 551761 (D.
Me. Feb. 21, 2007) (recognizing a Delaware series in a contract dispute).
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2012).
132. Id.
133. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(c).
134. Id.
135. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(d).
136. Id.
137. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(e).
138. Id.
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In sum, a Delaware LLC Agreement may eliminate all traditional fidu-
ciary duties such as the duties of care (to the extent one exists) and loy-
alty.139  By doing so, liability to the primary actor (i.e., member, manager
or other party to the agreement) will not attach and secondary liability of
advisors, such as attorneys, accountants, banks, investment advisors and
the like, will also not attach under any theory of aiding and abetting where
liability of the primary actor is required.
If an LLC agreement is silent as to modifications of fiduciary duties,
members, managers and other persons bound by the LLC agreement owe
no fiduciary duties to the LLC or to each other where the members, man-
agers and such other persons rely, in good faith, on provisions of the LLC
agreement.140  The DLLCA does not impose fiduciary duties but it does
explicitly set forth a stated policy of “freedom of contract.”141  To this ef-
fect, all contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing remain intact, but
common law fiduciary duties should be specifically addressed in the LLC
agreement.142
As an alternative to the insertion, limitation or explicit elimination of
all fiduciary duties,143 members may choose to limit or eliminate all liabili-
ties for breach of contract or breach of duty (including fiduciary duty) of
members, managers or other persons  that are bound by the LLC agree-
ment to the LLC or among each other.144 Under this alternative, a pri-
mary actor may escape liability for a breach of a duty but an advisor or
other “secondary party” could be found liable as an aider or abettor since
the “duty” remains intact.
Any of the modifications or eliminations of duties and/or liabilities that
may be accomplished for a “standard” LLC may also be attained in a se-
ries LLC through the LLC agreement.  In this manner, traditional fiduci-
ary duties should not be presumed to exist within each series unless
specifically drafted therein.  Stated differently, the series simply adds an-
139. See Ann E. Conaway, The Multi-Facets of Good Faith in Delaware: A Mistake in
the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; A Different Partnership Duty of Care; Agency
Good Faith and Damages; Good Faith and Trust Law, 10 DEL. L. REV. 89, 110-114 (2008).
140. See Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001–VCS, 2010 WL
2929708 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL
1961156 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008), aff’d, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009); Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F &
W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006). But see Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz
Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch. 2012), C.A. No. 4390 (Del. Nov. 7, 2012) (affirmed on
contractual grounds); In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 28, 2010), reprinted in 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 823 (2010); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP,
2010 WL 629850 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010); Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay
PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).
141. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(b).
142. See tit. 6, § 18-1101.
143. The contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot be limited or eliminated
in an LLC agreement. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(c).
144. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (there is no exculpation for a bad faith breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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other dimension that a drafter must consider regarding contractual versus
fiduciary duties and liabilities in Delaware unincorporated entities.
12. GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON STATEMENTS AND
OPINIONS IN WINDING UP
With respect to a member, manager or liquidating trustee’s good faith
reliance on statements and opinions in the winding up of the series LLC,
the DLLCA states in pertinent part:
A member, manager or liquidating trustee of a [Delaware LLC is] fully pro-
tected in relying in good faith upon . . . information, opinions, reports or state-
ments presented by another manager, member or liquidating trustee, an
officer or employee of the [LLC], or committees of the [LLC], members or
managers, or by any other person as to matters the member, manager or liqui-
dating trustees reasonably believe [to be] within such person’s professional or
expert competence.145
The information included under this “good faith” umbrella146 provides
additional protection from liability for members, managers or persons act-
ing as liquidating trustees where the persons reasonably rely in good faith
upon the professional statements and opinions of experts during the wind-
ing up or liquidation of the LLC business or the business of a series.147
13. INDEMNIFICATION
An LLC agreement may set forth any standards or restrictions regard-
ing indemnification.148  Consequently, an LLC agreement may provide
that any member or manager or other person may be indemnified and
held harmless against any and all claims and demands of whatever na-
ture.149  The authority granted under section 18-108 includes the advance-
ment of legal fees to a former manager in a current manager’s action for
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.150  The terms “indemnify
and hold harmless” are legal terms of art that do not include the unique
concept of advancement of fees.151  The public policy in Delaware for the
145. See tit. 6, § 18-406.
146. The information included under this umbrella includes:
information, opinions, reports or statements as to the value and amount of the assets,
liabilities, profits or losses of the [LLC], or the value and amount of assets or reserves or
contracts, agreements or other undertakings that would be sufficient to pay claims and
obligations of the [LLC] or to make reasonable provision to pay such cash and obliga-
tions, or any other facts pertinent to the existence and amount of assets from which
distributions to members or creditors might properly be paid.
Id.
147. See id.
148. See tit. 6, § 18-108.
149. See tit. 6, § 18-108.
150. See Senior Tour Players 207 Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Golftown 207 Holding Co., LLC,
853 A.2d 124 (Del. Ch. 2004).
151. See Majkowski v. Am. Imaging Mgt. Servs., LLC, 913 A.2d 572, 587-88 (Del. Ch.
2006).
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advancement of legal fees is one rooted in the fundamental tenet of free-
dom of contract in LLC agreements.152
14. DUAL STATUS; DOMESTICATION OR TRANSFER OF
NON-UNITED STATES ENTITIES
As with the statutory trust, the DLLCA provides that a non-United
States entity may domesticate in Delaware as an LLC and continue its
existence in the foreign jurisdiction as it did prior to domesticating in Del-
aware.153  If the domesticating foreign entity elects “dual status,” the do-
mesticating entity and the continuing foreign entity constitute a single
entity formed or created under the laws of Delaware and the laws of the
foreign jurisdiction.154  The approval necessary for the transaction is the
“manner provided for by the document, instrument, agreement or other
writing . . . governing the internal affairs of the non-United States entity
and the conduct of its business or by applicable non-Delaware law, as
appropriate.”155
The opposite transaction is also available for transferring Delaware
limited liability companies.  Pursuant to section18-213, a Delaware LLC
may transfer to a non-United States jurisdiction and simultaneously elect
to remain a Delaware LLC.156  If this “dual status” election is pursued, the
remaining Delaware entity and the transferred non-US entity constitute a
single entity governed by the laws of Delaware and the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction to which the Delaware entity transferred.157
The requirements necessary to approve these transactions is either (1)
set forth in the LLC agreement; (2) if not so specified in the LLC agree-
ment and the transfer or domestication and continuance is not prohibited
in the LLC agreement, then in the same manner as a merger or consolida-
tion; or (3) if a merger or consolidation is not specified and a transfer or
domestication and continuance is not prohibited, then by the majority
agreement of the members by their then current percentage interest in
profits.158
15. MERGING BETWEEN SERIES’
Although section 18-209 permits an LLC to merge with another entity,
section 18-215 has no such language.159  A series, however, is deemed a
152. See id. at 591.
153. See tit. 6, § 18-212.
154. See tit. 6, § 18-212(i).
155. See tit. 6, § 18-212(c)(6).
156. See tit. 6, § 18-213.
157. See tit. 6, § 18-213(e).
158. See tit. 6, § 18-213(b).
159. Tit. 6, § 18-209(b) (“Pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, 1 or
more domestic limited liability companies may merge or consolidate with or into 1 or more
domestic limited liability companies or 1 or more other business entities . . . .”).  The Illinios
statute, on the other hand, gives a series LLC all the rights of a general LLC, suggesting that
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“person”160 and therefore has the right to, inter alia, contract in its own
name.161  This right to contract permits each series to internally transfer
assets to other series’ (as well as to other persons or external entities).162
Transferring of assets, however, raises several issues.
First, as a practical matter, the transfer of an asset may trigger any due
on sale clause that may be associated with a particular asset.  Additionally,
a series is still subject to other applicable law governing the transfer of
assets.163  Moreover, absent an agreement to the contrary, transferring as-
sets requires a majority vote, pro rata, of each designated class or
group.164  This raises the issue of whether a “class or group” refers to the
LLC or to a particular series within the LLC. To resolve this issue, the
authors suggest that transferring assets by a series requires a majority vote,
pro rata, of a “class or group” of the general LLC.  This conclusion is
consistent with the notion that a series is derivative of the entity whose
property it holds (i.e., the general LLC).165
VI. COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SERIES LLCS
A. How Does a Series Work?
1. HOW IS A SERIES CREATED?
First, in order to create a series in Delaware, there must be an alloca-
tion or “separation” of the organization’s property or assets into smaller
“cells” or “units.”166 This allocation of property, assets or obligations of
the entity is thereafter to be chronicled in “separate and distinct
records.”167  Thus, the necessary first stage in the creation of a series is
characterized by an allocation of business property into smaller or “sepa-
rate” units—i.e., a “separating out” of property, assets or company
obligations.168
a series LLC may merge with another entity to the extent that a general LLC may merge
with another entity. See Allan G. Donn ET AL., Series LLCs Exhibits, ALI-ABA VIDEO L.
REV., at 5, Feb.17, 2012 (citing 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 180/37-40(b) (Lex-
isNexis 2012)).
160. See tit. 6, § 18-101(12).  It is important to note that an individual series is a “per-
son” and not a seperate legal entity.  As such, each individual series is deriviative of the LLC
entity whose property it holds. Discussed supra Part V.B.3.
161. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c).
162. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c).
163. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1304 (1996) (relating to fraudulent transfers).
164. But see tit. 6, § 18-215(f) (allowing for the modification of voting rights among
members or managers (or classes or groups of members or managers) associated with a
series).
165. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c); discussed supra Part V.B.3.  In particular, because each indi-
vidual series holds property belonging to the general LLC, it logically follows that the trans-
fer of such property requires a majority vote, pro rata, of a class or group of the general LLC.
166. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
167. See id.
168. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
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The second stage involves the linking of a member, manager or mem-
bership interest with a series for the purpose of receiving profits, losses,
and distributions and the determination of management rights and du-
ties.169  This “linkage” also serves the purpose of determining such matters
as the numbers necessary to take action for ordinary and extraordinary
events, adding members, managers or series, dissolution, merger or con-
version, and exit rights, to name a few.170  In sum, the second stage in-
volves the central contractual capstone of the series that sets forth all the
rights and duties of the persons associated with the series.  This stage de-
fines, and delimits, all powers of the members and managers except those
that will be governed by the statutory default rules of the governing stat-
ute.171  Other provisions of DLLCA may be added at this juncture, includ-
ing the addition, modification or elimination of common law fiduciary
duties,172 elimination of liability for breach of duties or good faith breach
of contract,173 indemnification,174 exit strategies,175 reasonable restric-
tions on information rights,176 restrictions on transfer of ownership inter-
ests,177 and dissolution upon specified events.178
The critical third stage ensures a limitation on liability of one series as
against any other.179  In order to achieve limited liability, notice of the
series must be referenced in a certificate of formation of the entity to be
organized.180  The certificate of formation can be amended to add a series
if the original certificate did not contain a series.181  In Delaware, a series
does not have to be in existence to satisfy the required notice for an
LLC.182  Good practice suggests that any certificate of formation refer di-
rectly to the statutory language on limitation of liability in order to ensure
maximum notice of the series and thus complete compliance with the stat-
utory directive of notice of the liability limitation.183
169. See tit. 6, § 18-215(e).
170. See tit. 6, § 18-215(e)-(f).
171. See tit. 6, § 18-215(e).
172. See tit. 6, § 18-1101.
173. See tit. 6, § 18-1101(e).
174. See tit. 6, § 18-108.
175. See tit. 6, § 18-601-607.
176. See Lonergan, A.3d at 1024 (Del. Ch.  2010) (parties may eliminate information
rights in Delaware LLCs under the guise of fiduciary duty).
177. See tit. 6, §§ 18-701-705.
178. See tit. 6, §§ 18-801-806.
179. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
180. See id.
181. See tit. 6, § 18-215(e).
182. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b); tit. 6, § 18-215(a) (indicating that an LLC agreement may
establish or provide for the establishment of individual series).  In contrast, a series statutory
trust requires an existing series to meet the notification requirement. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12 § 3804 (2006).
183. See infra Part V.B.
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If each of these three prongs is met, a statutory Delaware series LLC is
created with the practical effect of providing internal liability shields for
each separate allocated “unit” of entity property or assets for which sepa-
rate and distinct records are maintained.184  If distinct records are not
maintained or the required statutory notice is not satisfied, independent
liability shields between one failed series and the next will not be recog-
nized.185  In the case of a failed series, a creditor may proceed against
property or assets allocated to the failed series assigned to a member ac-
cording to a charging order as if the failed series had never been cre-
ated.186  However, the failure of one series does not affect the validity per
se of another.187
2. HOW CAN PRIVATE EQUITY FUND MANAGERS AND
VENTURE CAPITALISTS UTILIZE THE SERIES?
To answer the question in the subtitle, the authors created a hypotheti-
cal.  Delawidener University, a non-profit hypothetical organization, has
been in existence for nearly 50 years during which it has specialized in
environmental research and development.  In recent years, Delawidener
has witnessed considerable advancements in its development of alternative
energy technologies.  Despite these advancements, the University’s re-
search budget was drastically cut.  Knowing that it would not be able to
attract investors, such as private equity funds, due to the University’s non-
profit formation, Delawidener converted its business form into a series
LLC, becoming Delawidener University, LLC.188  Several series—the
non-profit series’—are designated for each of the University’s academic
programs.  A second series—a for-profit series—is formed to develop al-
ternative energy devices, including solar and wind energy programs.
As a series LLC, the University is able to attract a number of private
equity investors, both foreign and domestic, that are interested in helping
the environment189 while, at the same time, realizing a profit for their in-
vestments and beneficiaries.  Further, by structuring this company as a se-
ries LLC, the losses attributable to the non-profit series will not wander to
the assets of the for-profit series or to the parent LLC.  More important to
this scenario, the series form allows the University to operate with lower
administrative costs, pass-through taxation, and simplified corporate gov-
184. See tit. 6, § 18-215.
185. Contra tit. 6, § 18-215.
186. See tit. 6, § 18-703.
187. See tit. 6, § 18-215(a) (discussing the principle of “seperateness”).
188. For a discussion of other entities, such as the B-Corporation and L3C, that might
be utilized to achieve a similar objective (but without the benefits of using the series LLC)
see Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for So-
cially Driven Purposes, 38 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 772 (2012).
189. These investments may be considered “program-related investments” for tax pur-
poses. See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-1\MPE103.txt unknown Seq: 27  7-DEC-12 13:32
Fall 2012] The Delaware Series LLC 123
ernance.190  Through these benefits, the private equity firm will more
quickly realize any gain from its investment than it would have had the PE
firm invested in a similar company formed with separate and distinct
entities.
B. Will the Series be Treated as an Independent “Person” for
Purposes of Federal Bankruptcy Law?
In bankruptcy, any “person” may file a petition so long as such person
“resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United
States[.]”191  The term “person” is defined to include an individual, part-
nership, or corporation,192 but not an estate or trust (other than a business
trust).  The definition of “corporation” includes “a partnership association
organized under a law that makes only the capital subscriber responsible
for the debts of the association.193  This definition includes unincorporated
company or association,194 and a business trust195 and excludes limited
partnerships. As to partnerships, the defining characteristic for inclusion is
the vicarious liability of the partners and their obligation to contribute for
partnership debts - a trait not present in limited liability entities.196
So, where does that leave the Delaware series?  First, the amendments
to section 18-215 provide that the term “person” includes any “entity (or
series thereof)[.]”197  The amendment appears to provide that the series is
a legal “person.”  The intended purpose of the amendment was to make
clear that a “person” conducts such activities as contracting, granting liens
and holding property.198  The series cannot utilize merger statutes under
the 2007 amendments.199  The amendments also did not go so far as to
imbue the series with legal personhood independent of its organizing en-
tity status.200 Stated another way, once a series is formed, holds property,
and is vested with an individual member or manager, some “person” or
“agent” must be able to act for the series.  The 2007 amendments clarify
190. Other advantages include employee equity interest incentives, business asset pro-
tection and segregation, and the diversification of capital. See Zimmerman Law Firm, Intro-
ducing the Series Limited Liability Company – Now Playing in Texas, Delaware, Nevada, et
al (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.zimmermanfirm.com/introducing-the-series-limited-liability-
company-now-playing-in-texas-delaware-and-nevada/.
191. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006); see also Shannon L. Dawson, Series LLC and Bank-
ruptcy: When the Series Finds Itself in Trouble, Will it Need Its Parent to Bail it Out?, 35 DEL.
J. CORP. L., 515, 517 n.13 (2010).
192. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(a)(ii).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(a)(iv).
195. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(a)(v).
196. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-306 (2012) (Partner’s liability).
197. See tit. 6, § 18-101(12).
198. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c).
199. Discussed supra Part V.B.15.
200. Discussed supra Part V.B.3.
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that the series is a “person” for certain business reasons.  It does not an-
swer the question of “personage” for federal bankruptcy purposes.201
As to the series being a partnership under bankruptcy law, neither its
members nor managers have vicarious liability and thus fail the character-
istics necessary for partnerships under bankruptcy law.  By the same to-
ken, the only characteristic the series shares with a corporation is limited
liability.202
In light of the foregoing, at this juncture it would appear that an indi-
vidual Delaware series is not a “person” for purposes of federal bank-
ruptcy law and, therefore, cannot file a petition in bankruptcy without
statutory authority.203
C. Will a Delaware Series be Enforced in a Non-Series Jurisdiction?
Basic principles of comity suggest that a foreign court would recognize
the Delaware series and apply Delaware law, interpreting the legal effect
of a series upon members, managers or claimants to assets shielded by the
internal series limitations on liability.  In the only Delaware series case
decided by a non-Delaware court, GxG Management L.L.C. v. Young
Brothers and Co., Inc., the court was not put off by the existence of the
series.204  Rather, the court looked to the Delaware Act to determine
what capacity an LLC has to pursue litigation on behalf of a series or, in
the alternative, what capacity a series has to pursue litigation on its own
behalf or whether the series can be regarded as an entity distinct from the
LLC.205  In that case, the court found that the LLC had an interest suffi-
cient in the series so as to permit the LLC to maintain an action as a real
party in interest.206  In a subsequent ruling, the court made clear that it
had not decided that the series was a separate entity and that even if the
series could otherwise maintain an action in its own name, it could not in
this case because the action would arise out of the same set of facts being
litigated by the LLC.207
201. But see Series LLCs and Cell Companies, supra note 8, at 55699 (deeming a series
an “entity” for federal income tax purposes).
202. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b); See also CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011)
(holding that LLCs and corporations are different types of entities and operate under differ-
ent sets of rules; most notably, LLCs, unlike corporation, did not exist at common law); Ann
E. Conaway & Peter I. Tsoflias, Challenging Traditional Thought: No Default Fiduciary Du-
ties in Delaware Limited Liability Companies After Auriga, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. at 10 n.73
(forthcoming Dec., 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.?abstract_id=
1969053.
203. See Dawson supra note 191 (for additional material discussing the potential treat-
ment of a series in bankruptcy).
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In contrast to the Maine approach, in California the foreign law recog-
nition of a mere LLC is quite narrow.208  For example, in the case of But-
ler v. Adoption Media, LLC,209 a California court interpreted a reference
to “internal affairs and the liability and authority of its managers and
members” to simply mean a codification of the internal affairs doctrine
and not to include disputes arising as a result of negotiations by the LLC
or its agents with third parties.210
D. Who Owns the Assets of the Series—i.e., Is the
Series a Separate Entity?
Recall that a member of an LLC does not “own” property of an
LLC.211  Section 701 of the DLLCA provides that: “[a] member has no
interest in specific LLC property.”212  Thus, it is fundamental LLC law
that a member’s interest in an LLC is “personal property”213 and is an
income interest only.214  It therefore follows that if a member in an LLC
cannot own “property” of an LLC, a member of a series also cannot own
“property” of a series.  A member or manager owns neither more nor less
than that which a member or manager could own in an LLC—an “inter-
est” in income only.215
Management of an LLC is non-transferable unless provided for in an
LLC agreement or by consent of all members.216  “[T]he debts, obligations
and liabilities of  [an LLC], whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise,
[are] solely [those] of the [LLC] and no member or manager of [the LLC
is] obligated personally [for those] debts, obligations or liabilities . . . solely
by being a member or  . . . manager.”217  The LLC, not the members or
managers, has the authority to carry on the business, purpose or activity
for which the LLC was formed.218  Thus, the LLC, not its members, owns
its property.
What, if anything, changes with the formation of a series LLC? Section
18-215(a) provides that an LLC agreement may contain one or more series
of “members, managers, limited liability company interests or assets . . . .
[having] separate rights, powers or duties with respect to specified prop-
erty or obligations of the limited liability company or profits and losses
208. See Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, No. C04-0135 PJH, 2005 WL 2077484, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2005).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-701 (2012).
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See tit. 6, § 18-702(a)-(b).
215. See id.
216. Tit. 6, § 18-702(a).
217. Tit. 6, § 18-303.
218. See, e.g., tit. 6, § 18-106 (“A limited liablity company may carry on any lawful busi-
ness, purpose, or activity . . . .”).
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associated with specified property or obligations . . . .”219  Therefore, inter-
preting section 18-215(a) in a clear, reasonable manner, the LLC owns the
assets of the series; the series constitutes an allocation of company assets
for the purpose of limitations upon liabilities.  The creation of series of
property or obligations of the LLC or profits and losses associated with
LLC property or obligations may be viewed simply as allocations of LLC
property into “cells” or “units.”  If proper notice is given220 and “separate
and distinct records”221 maintained according to subsection (b), the in-
tended purpose of the series is a division of assets and a resulting limita-
tion upon liability to those assets, not the creation of an independent
entity.222
The legal and business communities, however, focus upon Delaware’s
2007 amendments to section 18-215 to suggest that the series is now, in
fact, an “entity.”223  In particular, the factors being debated with respect to
the 2007 amendments include that the series may:  (1) contract; (2) hold
title to assets; (3) grant liens or security interests; and (4) sue or be
sued.224
First, any “person” may “enter into a contract” unless that person is
either a minor225 or a mentally incapacitated person.226  In 2006, Dela-
ware amended the term “person” in the DLLCA to include a “limited
liability company . . . or any other individual or entity (or series
thereof).”227  By this addition, Delaware clearly answered that a “series”
is a “person” capable of contracting in a statutory sense.228  Whether an
individual agent acting on behalf of a particular series has capacity to con-
tract must be determined under the common law of contracts.229  The nu-
219. Tit. 6, § 18-215(a).  This is not to say that the LLC cannot act through it agents.
However, for the purpose of representation in court, neither a member or manager may
represent the LLC; Delaware legal counsel is necessary.  Poore v. Fox Hollow Enters., No.
93A-09-005, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 193 (1994).
220. See supra Part V.B.1.
221. Id.
222. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
223. See supra Part V.B (detailing the relevant 2007 amendments to the DLLCA); see
also Series LLCs and Cell Companies, supra note 8, at 55699 (deeming a series an “entity”
for federal income tax purposes).
224. Though it is not the authors’ opinion that individual series should be treated as
separate legal entities, these components, according to the authors, contribute to the argu-
ment that individual series may be treated as separate entities distinct from the parent LLC.
See tit. 6, § 18-215(a); sources cited supra note 35.
225. Of course, minors may enter into voidable contracts, meaning that the contract is
voidable by the minor until the minor’s coming of age and the acceptance, or ratification, of
the contract. See 2 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 10:1 (2012).
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 9-16 (1981) (discussing the parties
and parties’ capacity required to form a contract).
227. tit. 6, § 18-101(12).
228. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c) (authorizing a series LLC to contract in its own name).
229. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 226, §§ 9-16.
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ance to the amended definitional section is that the term “series” appears
in a derivative capacity,  i.e., series modifies “entity.”230  Thus, when this
“person” known as a “series” acts, it does so thereof231 as a series of a
LLC or other entity. Simply put, as its definition establishes, its personage
is derivative of the LLC that is formed if in the certificate of formation.
The series is not an independent “entity” as defined in the DLLCA.232  A
filing does not form the series with the Delaware Secretary of State.233
If the interpretation of “person” is correct, it follows that the series
may hold title to assets, grant liens or security interest and sue or be sued
in the same derivative manner.  In other words, the series is a “person” for
convenience purposes yet not as an independent legal entity that must file
a public document for its creation.234
E. Fiduciary Duties in a Series
Assume, for example, a series LLC is formed with two series, each of
which have one individual associated as a member of the series.  Assume
also that each member is assigned a 100 percent income interest in the
appropriate series.  Do the members owe each other default fiduciary du-
ties from one series to the other?  In the opinion of these authors, the
DLLCA does not set forth any default fiduciary duties and instead sup-
planted the common law presumption of duties by adopting a public policy
of freedom of contract.235
First, the LLC agreement spells out the rights and duties of the mem-
bers of the LLC, including the rights and duties of members associated
with series.236  In this case, the first two series are formed with a single
member associated with each independent series.  Each member receives
100 percent of the income rights from the series.  The question that re-
mains is whether the members owe default fiduciary duties within and
across series boundaries.
The common law in Delaware is presently in flux on the issue of
whether default fiduciary duties attach where an LLC agreement is other-
wise silent.237  There is no doubt that, under the DLLCA, the members
230. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c); discussed supra Part V.B.3.
231. See tit. 6, § 18-101(12).  The definition of “thereof” means “of that or it.” Thereof
Definition, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/thereof)
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
232. But see Series LLCs and Cell Companies, supra note 8, at 55699 (deeming a series
an “entity” for federal income tax purposes).
233. See tit. 6, § 18-215(a) (“A limited liability company agreement may establish or
provide for the establishment of 1 or more designated series . . . .”) (emphasis added).
234. Notwithstanding this logical interpretation, the IRS has deemed a series an entity
for federal income tax purposes. See 75 Fed. Reg. 55669.
235. See Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 202.
236. See. tit. 6, § 18-215(a).
237. Compare Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC,  No. 5001–VCS, 2010 WL
2929708 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010), and Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL
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may set forth provisions in the LLC agreement that limit or eliminate fidu-
ciary duties to each other.238  So long as the members act according to the
agreement, the members are protected in contract for good faith reliance
on those provisions and thus liability will not follow.239  However, there is
no exculpation for a bad faith breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing.240
Yet, another interpretation is suggested.  The manner in which the
DLLCA is crafted mandates a different approach.  Unlike the DGCL,
where the common law has firmly upheld fiduciary duties of care and loy-
alty for centralized management,241 the DLLCA has preempted the com-
mon law by prioritizing contractual principles above tort-based
concepts.242  The DLLCA option is both efficient and logical since an LLC
may be member-managed, manager-managed, managed by a non-eco-
nomic member or manager or any combination of the above.243  In short,
the LLC may organize its infrastructure with or without a manager and
with or without equity members.244  Thus, traditional notions of fiduciary
obligations do not fit the ever-changing LLC infrastructure.  Yet, as the
Delaware series LLC is contractual in nature,245 the duty of good faith and
fair dealing will attach to the performance and execution of the parties’
bargained-for exchange.246
1961156 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008), aff’d, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009), and ABRY Partners V, L.P.
v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006), with Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz
Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch. 2012), C.A. No. 4390 (Del. Nov. 7, 2012) (affirmed on
contractual grounds), and In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010), and Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850 (Del. Ch. Feb.
24, 2010), and Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS,
2009 WL 1124451 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009). See also Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 202;
Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221 (Summer 2009) (con-
cluding that Delaware LPs and LLCs should not have any default fiduciary duties, but rather
contractual duties according to the stated statutory policy of freedom of contract articulated
in each act); Nicole M. Sciotto, Note, Opt-in vs. Opt-out: Settling the Debate Over Default
Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLCs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing the
divergent views regarding default fiduciary duties circulating among the Delaware judiciary).
238. See tit. 6, § 18-1101.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 8 (2007) (discussing
common law fiduciary duties in the context of corporate governance).
242. See tit. 6 § 18-1101(b) (“it is the policy of [the DLLCA] to give the maximum effect
to the principle of freedom of contract.”).
243. See  tit. 6, § 18-402.
244. See id.
245. See tit. 6 § 18-1101(b).
246. See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126–27 (Del. 2010) (discussing the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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Even if the LLC agreement is silent as to fiduciary duties in a series
LLC, it follows that no fiduciary duty would attach since the series are
being maintained as distinct cells, with independent assets, obligations, in-
come and losses as well as with independent management.247  The default
rule should be that fiduciary duties do not run with each series and do not
cross series borders.  In this manner, the parties are better protected in
their bargain by the enforcement of the terms of the LLC agreement as
enforced by the duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Each series is segre-
gated for virtually all purposes: income, management, assets, liabilities and
business intent.248  As such, it is logical to assume that the members may
manage the series independently of the other without concern of common
law fiduciary duties.  However, given the divergent schools of thought with
respect to whether fiduciary duties apply by default in Delaware LLCs249
(as evidenced by Delaware case law),250 a cautious course of action might
be to explicitly eliminate all fiduciary duties in the LLC agreement.  This
wholesale elimination may be effectuated by including a statement that all
contractual duties and liabilities of each series are expressly limited to
each particular series.  This course of action is particularly important
where two or more members are associated with one or more series.
Consider a slight variation on this example.  Assume that the business
mentioned above is not an investment enterprise but instead involves the
operation of six liquor stores in Delaware and that only one liquor license
may be obtained for the business.  In this case, it makes sense for the prop-
erty owners to hold each liquor store in an independent “cell” for liability
and profits purposes and also to maintain all properties under one single
entity due to the licensing issue.  If a member or members are associated
with each store for purposes of management, profits, and day-to-day deci-
sion-making, should these members owe fiduciary duties across series
boundaries without question?  Here, the answer should again be “no”
since the reckless operation of one site could result in the loss of license
for all the remaining properties.
In the above circumstance, one could conclude that reasonable parties
would have considered negotiating this subject.  If the agreement is silent
on fiduciary duties, the parties should not be bound to a court drafting
terms into their agreement based upon a “hypothetical bargain” – terms
upon which neither party (likely on purpose) agree.  In other words, the
agreement is precisely what the parties’ desire, without the imposition of
common law care or loyalty obligations.  Many investors gravitate to Dela-
ware for the very purpose that they may draft their contracts in a sophisti-
247. See tit. 6, § 18-215.
248. See id.
249. See Sciotto, supra note 237 (summarizing the divergent schools of thought with
respect to this issue).
250. See cases cited supra note 237.
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cated manner.251  Is it efficient and useful in the predictable development
of Delaware’s LLC law to return to judicial paternalism in the enforce-
ment of LLC agreements?  The authors say not.  The authors posit that
Delaware benefits from its courts enforcing what the General Assembly
adopted so concisely in 1992.252
In addition, the series is clearly a “contract within a contract” with spe-
cial “records” and “separateness” requirements.  The most logical default
rule for duties is that of the contractual obligation of good faith and fair
dealing.  Although this contractual legal theory currently runs counter to
Delaware case law, the time is here when Delaware courts should recog-
nize that contractual entities that trade on a premium and the stated policy
of contractual freedom for Delaware LLCs should observe a default rule
of contractual duties rather than gap-filling fiduciary duties.  In any event,
in this hypothetical, the parties are certainly free to craft their fiduciary
duties to whatever suits their desires.  At this stage in the development of
Delaware law, it seems quite possible that a court would not impose fidu-
ciary duties under a “hypothetical bargain” given the distinctive contrac-
tual construction and liability barriers of the series.
VII. COMMON MISTAKES OCCURRING IN UTILIZING THE SERIES
A. Cross Collateralization
In order for the limitation on liability to be enforced as among series,
separate books and records, however reasonably maintained, must be
kept.253  Yet, no matter how vigorously records are maintained, if new
credit is being sought and a lender requires cross-collateralization among
the series, a serious question is raised whether a court would honor the
liability limitation.  In this circumstance, the authors recommend that se-
curity interests should not be granted across series’ borders.
In addition, drafters of LLC agreements should consider provisions
prohibiting members or managers from granting security interests in mem-
bers’ or managers’ interests in the LLC.  Just as the LLC can create cross-
collateralization issues, members and managers can cause the same
damage.
B. Creation of a Series—Utilizing the Necessary Language
What language is necessary to create a series? Section 18-215(b) simply
provides that notice in a certificate of formation of the “limitation on lia-
251. See Steele, supra note 237, at 237 (indicating that the choice to use the Delaware
LLC business form is an intentional one, made by sophisticated parties, driven by Delaware’s
policy to provide contracting parties to an LLC with the maximum flexibility to customize
their relationship).
252. See generally Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 202 (identifying several reasons why
Delaware benefits from avoiding the application of default fiduciary duties in the LLC
context).
253. See tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
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bilities of a series” is sufficient for all purposes, whether or not the LLC
has formed a series at the time the notice is included in the certificate of
formation.254  Is stating that the LLC is a “series LLC with all the limita-
tions provided by law” sufficient?  Probably.  Is simply referring to a series
LLC enough?  Probably not, since there is not a reference to a limitation
upon liability.  For practical purposes, a safer route would be to track the
language of the statute that creates the series, including the recitation of
the limitation on liabilities.255
C. Unallocated Property in a Governing Document
In some circumstances, an entity may terminate and be wound up with
unallocated property and no mechanism for the subsequent allocation of
that property.256  Since at the time of the formation of the organization it
is possible that the nature or circumstance of unallocated property makes
it unadvisable to adopt a preallocation system, a method by which the
property may be divided should be set forth in the LLC agreement.  Thus,
advisors using a series arrangement need to anticipate a decision-making
mechanism whereby unallocated property may be designated among se-
ries, members, the LLC itself, or otherwise.
D. Contracting by or on Behalf of a Series
This topic is quite controversial.  Recall that the 2007 amendments per-
mit a “series” to contract in its own “name.”257  Recall also that a “series”
is a “person” whose identity is derivative of the LLC as per the 2006
amendments.258 Therefore, although it is technically possible for a series
to contract in its own “name,” its status is derivative of the LLC.  Stated
another way, the series is not an “entity” independent of the LLC.  In
practice, therefore, a safe course is to have a series sign in the capacity of
254. See id.
255. The DLLCA provides:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in this chapter or under other appli-
cable law, in the event that a limited liability company agreement establishes or provides
for the establishment of 1 or more series, and if the records maintained for any such
series account for the assets associated with such series separately from the other assets
of the limited liability company, or any other series thereof, and if the limited liability
company agreement so provides, and if notice of the limitation on liabilities of a series as
referenced in this subsection is set forth in the certificate of formation of the limited
liability company, then the debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses incurred, contracted
for or otherwise existing with respect to a particular series shall be enforceable against the
assets of such series only, and not against the assets of the limited liability company gener-
ally or any other series thereof, and, unless otherwise provided in the limited liability com-
pany agreement, none of the debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses incurred,
contracted for or otherwise existing with respect to the limited liability company generally
or any other series thereof shall be enforceable against the assets of such series.
Id. (emphasis added).
256. See tit. 6, §§ 18-803-804.
257. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c).
258. See id.; discussed supra Part V.B.3.
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or thereof as a series of the organization formed. By statute, however, it
may sign in its own capacity.259
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Delaware series is an innovative and efficient method by which
attorneys and advisors may plan for “classes,” “groups” or “series” of in-
terests and provides notice of the groups, classes or series, and limit liabil-
ity to the interests and assets attached to it.  If the parties who use “series”
or other such classifications are informed as to the purposes and “rules”
regarding their use, series provide good business planning for the in-
formed.  Most importantly, series require careful consideration of general
default rules, specific default rules within the series provision, and the spe-
cific intent of the parties using the series.  The issue of whether fiduciary
or contractual duties constitute the default rule for series in particular or
LLCs in general has yet to be resolved.  As a result, practitioners should
draft with specificity in order to maximize enforceability of their clients’
agreements.
The conundrum of the enforcement of the liability shield for the series
“cells” should be resolved in favor of upholding the shield where the series
statute is followed by drafters.  However, given that the test for the en-
forceability of the series shield will likely occur in a bankruptcy court
makes the certainty of outcome more uncertain given the LLC’s track re-
cord in bankruptcy thus far.
All in all, the Delaware series is a complex, yet innovative and efficient
tool for business planning especially in the venture capital and private eq-
uity paradigm.  Accordingly, close, careful drafting is needed in order for
the series to succeed.
259. See tit. 6, § 18-215(c).
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APPENDIX260
A. Total New Series Alternative Entity Formations Compared to Total
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260. All statistics, which are collected from secretary of state websites, are on file with
the authors.





2012 YTD: 195/12,228 (1.59%)
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C. Series Formations263
2011: 2,131/92,946 (2.29%)
2012 YTD: 195/11,280 (1.73%)
263. Note, this chart accounts for all series entity formations (not just series LLCs).
